Ray Brassier, "The Persistence of Form: Hegel and Psychoanalysis

quote of the day

“But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself.... Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it. This tarrying with the negative is the magical power that converts it into being. This power is identical with what we earlier called the Subject.”

- Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Hegel on Architecture and Sculpture

Great discussion on Hegel's aesthetic theory on architecture and sculpture.

Link HERE.

Object Oriented Ontology could probably use the following argument...

"John Locke explains that the idea of substance is how we know things exist outside of our minds. He believed that substance is 'what can exist on it’s own,' not dependent on another”(Philosophical Conversations, Melchert, Chapter 10, page 281). He believed this was a crucial piece to proving that things we experienced actually existed outside of our minds. He spoke to the power of substances, using the example of a magnet attracting iron fillings. If we know that something has a power to change another thing, we know it has substance and exists."

So by virtue of affect we can abduce that the originator of the affect is a.) certainly different from me, an external agent acting upon me in some way; and b.) there must be a power behind the affect that is both of some substance (not a "hanging-on-nothing" sensate quality) and which is capable of expressing or externalizing that power. Thus we have a sensate yet semiotic expression of some different external power, generated by an agent of some kind.

Discerning exactly what that substance is, however, is an entirely different quality. If sensate qualities are all that we can perceive (without possessing in any way entrance into, or observation of, the substance) then we are left with the problem that Hume had concerning qualities and then what stands behind them. Hegel addresses Hume's problem in The Phenomenology of Spirit (the sugar cube example).

It is for this reason that I believe German Idealism was "already beyond this problem" and indeed has already moved beyond any correlationist-appearance nonsense. A close study of Fichte, or Hegel for that matter, clearly proves this beyond a shadow of a doubt.

The Iphigenia Inquiry

Probably the best self-produced YouTube series in the subject of philosophy that I've seen. Up there with Half Hour Hegel in terms of substance and intellectual quality, most definitely. Sadly under-viewed, don't let its somewhat narrow title of specialization fool you. Excellent material. Link HERE.

Revisiting Brassier's Deleveling of Object-Oriented Ontology: A Problem for Object-Oriented Ontology (that is Not a Problem for Ordinal Naturalism)

"Revisiting Brassier's Deleveling of Object-Oriented Ontology: 

A Problem for Object-oriented Ontology (that is Not a Problem for Ordinal Naturalism)"

Ray Brassier’s critique of object-oriented ontology is devastating. His primary purpose is to re-level the function of raized generality within immanence and hence re-invigorate a naturalized form of transcendence which is independent of perceiving transcendent consciousness and its horizon of apprehension. It is thus a form of scientific realism, pragmatism, and what I am currently referring to as “transcendental naturalism” in my own angle of vision which follows this part of Brassier’s thinking. One might think of this as a vector, an intersection, of Brassier’s work with that of Iain Hamilton Grant as transcendental naturalism is also, simultaneously, a transcendental materialism that admits the reality of the vital negative, that among other organic yet immanent features of the Hegelian and Schellingean systems.

As Brassier correctly points out, the sort of “flat ontology” merely posited by object-oriented ontology fails not only because it is simply posited, but because it lacks what Justus Buchler has articulated as “ontological ordinality.” In Buchler’s famous Metaphysics of Natural Complexes he identifies two necessary pillars required for any ontology that purports to be a naturalism as well. One is “ontological parity” – the idea that no object of nature is more real, nor any less real, than any other object of nature. (This idea sounds remarkably similar to the “ontological flatness” posited by the object-oriented ontologists despite Buchler having articulated it thirty five years earlier.) The other pillar is “ontological ordinality” – the idea that whatever is, is naturally complex. Meaning, there are no metaphysical simples. And further, as such, ordinality means that no object can be entirely unrelated to anything else and still be considered a singular, simple individual (thus it follows that to be is to be related). Thus Buchler provides us with a picture of nature that is more capacious and robust than the “flatness” posited by the object-oriented ontologists as for Buchler nature is “whatever is, in whatever way it is.” Buchler does not reduce any items of nature to assumed grounds independent of the traits which relate hem, nor does he reduce objects simply to the relations among and between objects themselves. This is important because Buchler’s ordinal ontology contains parity, successfully, in a way which object-oriented ontology fails to do. And thus Buchler’s ordinal naturalism and its twin principles of ontological parity and ontological ordinality is immune to the sorts of criticisms leveled against object-oriented ontology and its failure to provide for an adequate rendering of nature.

There are four theses of object-oriented ontology that Brassier identifies which fail (quite miserably) specifically within the scope of ontology, and more generally within speculative and realist metaphysics. They are as follows:

1. There is no transcendence. No one sort of entity is the origin or ground of explanation of all others.
2. There is no generality (universality). No one sort of entity (or presumably method or discipline) accounts for (or explains) any possibility of unity or commonness to be had among all others.
3. There are no internal relations among entities. All relations are external and involve sensuous qualities only.
4. There is not ontological “dignity.” No entity can be asserted to rank higher or lower within an ontological continuum and thus all entities are ontologically univocal. (All “is.” Nothing is not.)

Aside from the fact that at least two of these are mutually contradictory, it is Brassier’s calling out as fatal one of these theses alone that I find to be relevant here, for even though it but one point of contention Brassier demonstrates quite clearly why the failure of this thesis as posited fails on several fronts at once and collapses the whole project. In a future post I shall double-back to Buchler’s ordinal naturalism avoids these criticisms and thus survives what is rightly a death-blow to a quasi-naturalistic ontology as well as charlatan metaphysics that has no right to claim any kind of systematicity whatsoever (let alone rationalistic rigor).

1. Brassier points out that the denial of transcendence (at least as its denial is posited here) denies forms, species and genera, natural kinds (and thus also natural difference; that is, an internal principle of differentiation), abstracta, and law.

2. He also points out that the second thesis denies the possibility of totality, whether universe or One-All. This would also deny the  Absolute.

3. The third denies subjectivity. This thus denies not only epistemological relevance to any and all objects, but also any re-presentation (repetition) required for any meaningful notion of ontological difference.

4. And finally, the fourth thesis inadvertently denies ontological integrity as it denies ontological “dignity.” The vital negative is lost as is difference sui generis, also by theses one and three.

Following Brassier, I only wish to address one of these theses. It is the same thesis Brassier addresses and then identifies as being fatal for the very ontology operating within “object-oriented” ontology.

As the objects of nature are claimed to be immanent to themselves, the essential nature of (and relevant relations to) objects collapse upon themselves. Correlationism is still present, although it is merely shifted from subject-object relation to object-object relation. As an aside, this move accomplishes nothing other than illegitimately attempting to save essential natures (“quiddity”) and internal relations without calling those relations as such.

As Brassier points out, fatal problems result. As transcendental naturalists believe (as do transcendental materialists), it is impossible to specify the ground or principle of object-individuation. Moreover, if we add the loss of generality (universality) to the loss of transcendence (or the “transcendental,” the conditions for the possibility of x, to follow Kant) then we cannot precisely identify what objects are in general – it becomes vacuously empty – nor can we say what objects are in particular, for we have lost quiddity. Objects cannot enter into relations for there is no internal nature to be related. If there are only sensuous qualities that could interact or be related then those relations proliferate to the extent that they cannot refer (intend) any essence. Brassier writes, “…the immediate consequence of adopting this full-blown object-oriented immanence is that we cannot say what anything really is.”

The pluralism so fondly cherished by the object-oriented ontologists suddenly collapses as well. As it does it finds itself ruthlessly subjected to its own second thesis. No internal principle of difference, no ground of differentiation, no internal relations, and suddenly All is One. Again, Brassier: “…if we cannot specify the essential qualities that distinguish one real object from another how can we be sure that the discrete multiplicity of sensual objects does not mask an underlying continuity…?” Object-oriented ontology has “undermined” (as compared to “over-ming”) itself. Further, without real difference we are left with nominalism. Or better even, psychological nominalism. Bundles of perceptions that cannot be explained without a correlational observer and philosopher of access to impart upon the perceptions a unity. As such there is no rational way to determine the nature of identity. No logical way to render the supposed pluralism found within the univocal sense of being posited. Hegel’s critique of Hume using the sugar cube example in The Phenomenology of Spirit is an excellent illustration of this fatal foundational flaw in the object ontologists metaphysics.

To conclude, I find it extremely interesting, but also perplexing, frankly, the object-oriented ontology finds Deleuze or Manuel De Landa to be an influence. They appear to mimic the commitment to individuals yet in throwing out the ground of difference at all cost deny the functional components required for any object to be an individual from the start. Thus the ultimate failure of object-ontology is not just a failure of transcendence, it is one of immanence as well.

Ray Brassier, "Principled Compassion, Compulsive Freedom" (VIDEO)

Parts TWO | THREE | FOUR | FIVE

Quote of the day

"The idea that unites all is the idea of beauty, taking the world in a higher, Platonic sense. I am now convinced that the highest act of reason, that in which reason contains all ideas, is an aesthetic act, and that truth and goodness are only united in beauty. Indeed, the philosopher must possess as much aesthetic power as the poet. The philosophy of spirit is [fundamentally] an aesthetic philosophy."

- "The Oldest Programme for a System of German Idealism" (1795-97)

[Authorship attributed to Schelling, Hegel, and Hoelderlin, jointly]

Current status (or, what I am working on)

PHOTO: Niemoczynski, from the Hoelderlin Path.

Hegel on the Proofs and the Personhood of God: Studies in Hegel's Logic and Philosophy of Religion (NDPR Review)

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Hegel on the Proofs and the Personhood of God: Studies in Hegel's Logic and Philosophy of Religion
// Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // 


Robert R. Williams, Hegel on the Proofs and the Personhood of God: Studies in Hegel's Logic and Philosophy of Religion, Oxford University Press, 2017, 352pp., $95.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198795223.

Reviewed by Nicholas Adams, University of Birmingham

This is a book for those interested in the intricacies of Hegel's philosophy of religion. It asks and answers two questions: how can Hegel's accounts of the proofs for God's existence best be understood; in what sense is Hegel's God 'personal'?
The study is split into two halves named in the title. The first part, chapters 1 to 3, treats Hegel's handling of the proofs for God's existence, principally in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (which contains Hegel's defence of Anselm against Kant) and the Lectures on the Proofs for the Existence of God (published for the first time in English in 2007 in a translation by Peter Hodgson). The second part investigates...


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Bonn Summer School in German Philosophy: Naturalism in Classical German Philosophy (July 9-20, 2018)

For those in Europe/Germany perhaps of interest...

Bonn Summer School in German Philosophy - Summer 2018

July 9th-20th, Bonn University
"The Issue of Naturalism in Classical German Philosophy" 

(8th International Bonn Summer School in German Philosophy)

Course description:

This year’s international summer school will focus on the issue of naturalism within classical German philosophy. “Naturalism” is a vague concept. As the term is used today it often connotes at least the following (in fact only loosely interrelated) theses: (1) that there are no transcendent objects (e.g. gods or immortal souls); (2) that everything is physical or at least fully describable with the resources of the natural sciences alone; and (3) that human beings are part of the animal kingdom. So understood, “naturalism” was already a central issue in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy.

In the first week, we will look at various controversies in the 18th century which set the terms of the debate over the prospects of forms of naturalism. The second week will be dedicated to a close reading and reconstruction of Hegel’s philosophy of nature in his mature Encyclopedia. In this context, we will also consult the Schellingian background of Hegel’s philosophy of nature in order to address the issue of naturalism within the overall idealist framework of Hegel that traditionally seemed to be in conflict with the naturalism of his successors.

Many of the most explosive debates of the period revolved around one or more aspects of naturalism, including the debate between the Condillac, Rousseau, Süßmilch, and Herder concerning the origin of language; the debate between Haller and La Mettrie concerning the significance of Haller’s animal experiments on “irritation”; the Pantheism Controversy between Jacobi and Mendelssohn concerning Spinozism; the Atheism Controversy concerning Fichte’s alleged atheism; and the Materialism Controversy that arose in the middle of the nineteenth century. Moreover, virtually all of the major thinkers of the period wrestled with the issue in one way or another, including Kant, Herder, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Alexander von Humboldt, Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Langer, Helmholtz, and Haeckel.

In the summer school we will look at the German philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries through the lens of this issue. Specific topics covered within the seminar and by our keynote speakers will include the debate on the origin of language; Kant, Herder, Hegel, and others on human-animal difference; the Haller-La Mettrie debate and the Materialism Controversy; the role of Spinozism in German philosophy; Kant’s anti-naturalist strategies; the philosophy of nature in Schelling, Hegel, and Humboldt; the emergence of philosophical atheism in Feuerbach, Marx, and Nietzsche; and the German contribution to and reception of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection.

As always, we will provide all participants with a reader containing the material to be discussed in our seminar meetings and by our keynote speakers.

For more information (or presumably to inquire if one might attend despite not presenting):  philosophy-summerschool@uni-bonn.de

Website HERE.

Hegel on Philosophy in History (NDPR Review)

Info below.

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Hegel on Philosophy in History
// Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // News


Rachel Zuckert and James Kreines (eds.), Hegel on Philosophy in History, Cambridge University Press, 2017, 260pp., $99.99 (hbk), ISBN 9781107093416.

Reviewed by Kristin Gjesdal, Temple University

This volume, published to honor the work of Robert Pippin, includes contributions by an impressive range of German and Anglophone scholars: John McDowell, Sally Sedgwick, Ludwig Siep, Paul Redding, Robert Stern, Terry Pinkard, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Karl Ameriks, Christoph Menke, Axel Honneth, Jay Bernstein, Slavoj Žižek, and Jonathan Lear. The volume addresses central topics in Hegel's work as well as debates in recent Hegel scholarship, most often (but by no means exclusively) with reference to Pippin's work. Attention is paid both to the limits and nature of subjectivity (autonomy, self-consciousness, self-legislation, recognition, spontaneity) and to the nature of the modern project -- i.e., key topics in Pippin's work, whether in his early study of Kant's theory of form, his seminal interpretation...


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Wolfendale and Transcendentalism

I won't comment on a lengthy but well-worth-the-read post, which is quite personal and explores just as much, put up recently by one Pete Wolfendale, HERE. Titled "Transcendental Blues" it is a personalized exploratory post that takes the reader through topics such as mental health and suicide, neuroscience and logic, and much of Mark Fisher's work.

I've indirectly known Pete for a few years and have only corresponded with him some, but from reading the post I certainly feel for him. Along with Terence Blake and Ray Brassier, Pete has been grouped along with myself in an "axis of address" toward neo-rationalism, pragmatism and naturalism, recent French philosophy and the sciences, and (critically) Deleuze, Badiou, Laruelle, and Meillassoux. But those are not the only reasons I identify with what he has to say (see page 162 and onward which addresses inane comments made by a certain blog kingpin concerning some supposed "neurology deathcult" and "mindless rationalism" that is "brainwashing" poor young graduate students, a deathcult that is best represented by we "rationalist mindslaves" HERE).

Pete has also put up two rather good papers HERE and HERE covering "Transcendental Realism" and "The Value of Art."

To be frank, if I were pressed to label the axis in question (which I'm not, so this is free-form), I would say that my proposed titling of it as a "speculative naturalism" would seem to fit (even for Blake whose discussions often center on scientific methodology moreso than nature per se. Still, Blake should nevertheless be included). But is this axis a "neurology deathcult?" Are "rationalist mindslaves" "brainwashing" poor young graduate students? Hardly. Speculative naturalism just fits so much better and is actually an honest encapsulation of what brings together these four philosophers, as I see it at least.

Some books I am reading for research over break (with NDPR links)

Abstracts and links to the NDPR reviews below. I have to say that all of these books are quite good and proving useful so far.

Nicholas F. Stang, Kant's Modal Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2016, 352pp., $74.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198712626.

Reviewed by Andrew Chignell, University of Pennsylvania

The dust jacket of this book features anatomical drawings of a narwhal and a unicorn. They are Kant's own examples: he says that we can't tell just by looking at the drawings (or considering our concepts) which of these animals actually exists. We have to go and investigate. But are we able to tell, just by considering our concepts, whether narwahls or unicorns are at least possible?

A "logicist," in Nicholas Stang's terminology, says yes: whether or not something is possible is entirely a function of the logical relations between the predicates contained in its concept. So if the concept contains a (hidden or explicit) contradiction, then unicorns are impossible. Conversely, if there is no contradiction...  

More HERE.

Allen W. Wood, Fichte's Ethical Thought, Oxford University Press, 2016, 321 pp., $60.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198766889.

Reviewed by Michael Baur, Fordham University

This is the third of three books Allen Wood has written on ethical thought in the tradition of German Idealism. The other two -- Hegel's Ethical Thought (1990) and Kant's Ethical Thought (1999) -- focus on two thinkers often understood to represent the starting-point and the ending-point of German Idealism. Wood's aim in this third book is to show that Fichte is not just one more philosopher among others in a neatly-defined tradition known as German Idealism, and, more emphatically, that Fichte's thought cannot be adequately understood if it is characterized merely as a way station on a philosophical path that leads more-or-less directly from Kant to Hegel. By the end, Wood has told us enough to make genuinely serious...

More HERE.

David James and Günter Zöller (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Fichte, Cambridge University Press, 2016, 419 pp., $110.00 (hbk.), ISBN 9780521472265.

Reviewed by Angelica Nuzzo, Graduate Center, City University of New York

As in all "companion" volumes -- a genre that has become increasingly popular in recent years -- this book offers an overarching account of Johann Gottlieb Fichte's philosophy that addresses the historical context, the main systematic issues, and the different disciplinary fields of his thought, and also gives an overview of its successive reception (from the contemporary debate in Fichte's own time to today's reception in the philosophy of mind). Such an overarching account is particularly important and useful in the case of a philosopher who never published an organized "system," as his contemporary Hegel did, or whose philosophy does not seem to have followed a clearly outlined progressive development, such as Kant's critical thought. In addition, given the historical position that Fichte occupies...

More HERE.

Frederick C. Beiser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2008, 518pp., $32.99 (pbk), ISBN 9780521539388.

Reviewed by Robert M. Wallace, www.robertmwallace.com

Fred Beiser has edited a successor volume to the original Cambridge Companion to Hegel (1993). The contributions are all brand new, and many of them explore areas in Hegel that were treated poorly or not at all in the original Companion, including Hegel's philosophy of religion, his philosophy of nature (the subject of three first-rate essays here), his aesthetics (two essays), and his relation to hermeneutics and to mysticism. The title is quite misleading; the book deals only with Hegel and his immediate predecessors and contemporaries. As with many Cambridge Companions, the book isn't really designed for beginners. For students who have some relevant background, and for scholars, the book is a very high quality collection covering quite a lot of what a comprehensive volume on Hegel should cover. It omits only a couple of what I take to be key topics, which I'll touch on below.

More HERE.

Two fantastic SEP entries: "Logic and Ontology" and "Bradley's Regress Argument"

The "Bradley's Regress Argument" obviously draws from Hegel in several important ways. As is well known, Bradley was a British idealist and the example using the the sugar cube comes directly from Hegel's Phenomenology.

"Logic and Ontology" entry HERE and "Bradley's Regress Argument" HERE.

New tag "Logic."

What does it mean to be an idealist?

Interesting article HERE in the October issue of Epoché . I've linked the table of contents because there are a few other good articles (one on Kant in particular) that are quite good.

Creating new tag "Kant." There are many posts about Kant, not sure why I've never formally done that before.

Hegel futuriste - à propos de "Logique de la science-fiction" de Jean-Clet Martin / Mickaël Perre

« Il faudrait arriver à raconter un livre réel de la philosophie passée comme si c’était un livre imaginaire et feint. »
(Deleuze, Différence et répétition, p. 4)

« La Logique (…) se place au-dessus de l’art de son temps, sans doute au-delà de toute esthétique humaine, annonçant des modes d’expression qui n’existaient pas à l’époque de Hegel, des médiations imageantes que son texte appelle, très en avance sur lui-même, vers des créations qu’il ne manquera pas d’inspirer. »
(Jean-Clet Martin, Logique de la science-fiction, p. 132)

« Quoi de plus gai qu’un air du temps ? » demandait Gilles Deleuze peu avant la parution de Différence et répétition[1]. Cette question n’est pas seulement l’expression d’une certaine modestie visant à atténuer l’originalité de sa pensée en la référant à un mouvement d’ensemble dont elle dépendrait. La référence à l’air du temps dissimule en réalité une thèse sur l’origine des problèmes philosophiques : comment expliquer que des penseurs différents, appartenant à des générations différentes, évoluant dans des espaces théoriques différents, puissent poser les mêmes problèmes ? Comment rendre compte de ces convergences ? Si les problèmes doivent être construits et ne se posent jamais d’eux-mêmes, on peut parfois avoir l’impression qu’ils évoluent dans un temps virtuel et participent d’un « esprit du temps »[2]. Cela ne veut pas dire qu’ils sont déjà là, disponibles, n’attendant qu’un penseur volontaire pour les cueillir et les exposer. Les problèmes participent peut-être d’un « air du temps », mais il faut encore être capable de les « reconnaître » ; il faut d’abord être sensible aux virtualités d’une époque avant d’en actualiser les problèmes. Les grands penseurs sont tous des « voyants » en ce sens[3] : ils voient les problèmes là où les autres se contentent de répéter ce qui a déjà été dit ; ils ne s’en tiennent pas à l’histoire des problèmes mais scrutent l’invisible, quitte à revenir les « yeux rouges », fatigués par l’effort d’une vision attentive aux devenirs. Comme le remarque Deleuze dans son texte sur le « structuralisme », c’est seulement parce qu’ils permettent de décrire l’appartenance à un « air libre du temps » que les « mots en -isme sont parfaitement fondés », « tant il est vrai qu’on ne reconnaît le gens, d’une manière visible, qu’aux choses invisibles et insensibles qu’ils reconnaissent à leur manière. »[4]

Le livre de Jean-Clet Martin semble s’inscrire lui aussi dans un « esprit du temps ». Mais cet « air du temps » ne correspond plus tout à fait à celui que Deleuze décrit dans l’Avant-propos de Différence et répétition, à savoir celui d’un « anti-hégélianisme généralisé »[5]. Logique de la science-fiction relève d’une dynamique comparable à celle qui anime le livre de Mark Alizart, Informatique céleste[6] : que signifie lire Hegel aujourd’hui ? Comment penser avec lui ? Comprendre Hegel n’est-ce pas « penser Hegel contre Hegel »[7] ? Ces deux livres, parus à quelques mois d’intervalle, nous donnent à découvrir un autre Hegel et cherchent à savoir, selon les mots de Foucault, « jusqu’où Hegel, insidieusement peut-être, s’est approché de nous »[8]. Celui-ci nous parle encore aujourd’hui parce qu’il était déjà en son temps un penseur « futuriste ». C’est du moins ce que ces deux auteurs ont vu à leur manière : non seulement la Science de la Logique déploie l’ontologie de notre modernité informatique[9] mais ce « livre extraordinaire » (p. 19) est aussi la machine philosophique à laquelle s’alimentent toutes les œuvres de science-fiction. L’air du temps est donc peut-être celui d’un « hégélianisme futuriste » s’efforçant de rendre la Logiqueà son incroyable puissance visionnaire et prospective : texte « très en avance sur lui-même » (p. 132) dont nous commençons à peine à mesurer les effets.

Continued HERE.

New theory of why the universe is three dimensional draws upon Hegelian trichotomic ontology

As it turns out, the Schelling-Hegel-Peirce axis explains the universe. Onto-cosmological "intercommutations lead to the well-known scaling behavior in cosmic string networks" - structurally in essence the categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness; Schellingean invisible matter; Hegelian synthesis incarnate.

Geesh, haven't thought about that sort of thing in a long, long while.

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A New Theory Explains Why the Universe Is Three Dimensional
https://www.space.com/38538-a-new-theory-explains-why-the-universe-is-three-dimensional.html
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quote of the day

Q. Meillssoux

"The most underrated thinkers in the history of philosophy are Reinhold, Jacobi, Maimon: the German thinkers who formed the junction between Kant and Fichte. With these philosophers, we draw close to the edge of what would soon become the volcano of German Idealism. It is a volcano that would not have been able to erupt without them, even though Schelling and Hegel esteemed them lightly."

- Quentin Meillassoux

quote of the day

"Essence becomes matter in that matter's reflection is determined by relating itself to essence as much as it does to the formless indeterminate. Matter, therefore, is the simple identity, void of distinction, that essence which is, with the determination that it is, the other of form. Hence it is the proper base or substrate of form, since it constitutes the immanent reflection of the determinations of form,or the self-subsistent term, to which such determinations refer as to their positive subsistence.

If abstraction is made from every determination, from every form of a something at all, matter is what is left over. Matter is the absolutely abstract."

- G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic