A1. Monism: Metaphysical (Ontological) Idealism: All is mind. No dualism possibile as any appearance reduces to mind. Reality *is* mind.
A2. Dualism: Epistemological Idealism: to to know matter "external" to the mind is to explain mind itself (cannot explain matter without mind). No monism possible.
B1. Monism: Metaphysical (Ontological) Materialism: All is matter. No dualism possible. All appearances reduce to matter. Reality *is* matter.
B2. Dualism: Epistemolgical Materialism: to explain "mind" is only to explain matter itself (cannot explain mind without matter). No monisim possible.
Is a monist realism possible? Yes, only in Hegel - so only Hegel is the true "realist."
Argument:
Premise : Realism: B2 is always A1 or A2. Realism is always an idealism.
Scientific / reductive materialism is a realism (matter more real than mind).
Naive realism, same as above.
Non-reductive materialism, same as above.
Conclusion: It seems that dualistic positions are contradictory to monist ones, yet rely upon them for veracity. Only A1 can handle the contradiction. To be a materialist is to be an idealist and to maintain co-related matter and mind: dualism, requiring one side to be "more real " than the other, which begs either A1 or A2. A2 is stronger than B1 or B2, so the prior positions deduce to A1.
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1. Ideal Realism:
2. Transcendental Idealism:
3. Transcendental Materialism:
4. Transcendental Realism:
5. Speculative Idealism:
6. Speculative Materialism:
7. Speculative Realism:
8. Immanent Idealism:
9. Immanent Materialism:
10. Immanent Realism:
Question: What cannot be deducted back to A1? (The above was inspired by my reading of Pratt's "What is Speculative Idealism?")
