- Hartshorne on internal and external relations
- In defense of relations (again)
- Whitehead's concept of importance and James' "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings"
- Hartshorne, Leibniz, panpsychism
- Whitehead's God and powers: a response to "subjectalism"
- Shaviro on aesthetics and forms of life
- What is Nature?
- The upholding and sharing of value intensity
- Do animals grieve?
From Charles Hartshorne, The Zero Fallacy.
MV: One perhaps puzzling aspect of your philosophy is your “idealism.” For you, objects do not depend on our particular experiences of them; rather, you believe in the asymmetrical dependence of subjects on their objects. Thus, epistemologically speaking, you are not an idealist but a realist. However, you contend that “Epistemological realism is entirely compatible with metaphysical idealism.” What, exactly, does your “metaphysical idealism” entail, and is “idealistic” indeed an appropriate label for your type of metaphysics?
H: I deal with this especially in “The Synthesis of Idealism and Realism,” Theoria 15 (1949); also in “What was True in Idealism,” Philos 43 (1946). The key is fourfold: (1) subject-object relations are subject-subject relations so far as objects are active singulars and concrete, otherwise the objects are abstractions from or collections of such subjects; (2) actual objects are temporally prior to and hence independent of subjects to which they are given; (3) subjects (Leibniz) are enormously varied and in the vast majority of kinds more or less radically different from human persons, varying from feelings of electrons, say, at the lower end of the hierarchy, to God at the upper end; (4) fully concrete and particular subjects are not persons and the like, but single experiences (Whitehead’s actual entities). My psychicalism and Whitehead’s “reformed subjectivism” are virtually the same, so far as I can see. The subject-object relation is prehension. No one else ever clearly had this idea previously. Tibetan Buddhism seems to have come fairly close, Berkeley and Hegel not at all.