I received a copy of the new American Journal of Theology and Philosophy issue featuring in print my review of Pugliese's The One, the Many, and the Trinity: Joseph A. Bracken and the Challenge of Process Metaphysics.
Also from Indiana University Press and AJTP, I received the proof pages for my article on Deleuze and ecstatic naturalism titled, "Nature's Transcendental Creativity: Deleuze, Corrington, and an Aesthetic Phenomenology."
My review of Hartshorne's Creative Experiencing will appear for that journal as well, probably within a few months time. (As a side note: a review also appeared on pragmatism and naturalism - the book title is eluding me at the moment - but it was written by my very good friend, Martin Yalcin, who also has an interest in philosophical naturalism and theology like I do.
A Philosophy of Sacred Nature: Prospects for Ecstatic Naturalism is well underway, suffering a delay but now back on track. We are hoping it will be in print within 8-10 months. My chapter is titled, "Ecology, Aesthetics, and Nature's Theological Value."
Otherwise I have yet to begin my entry on Peirce for the Peirce dictionary (through De Groyter Mouton) and my entry on "speculative realism" due to the IEP.
Tuesday, October 9, 2012
Sunday, October 7, 2012
Frederick Beiser interview at 3:AM
relations and value experience (part 2)
 |
| Alfred North Whitehead |
My initial thought that generation, creativity, temporalism and change ("process") happens to be more significant for Whitehead than a theory of relations as such (i.e. "relationism") can be found HERE. Of course, process and actual occasions ("instants") go hand-in-hand.
While this is on my mind, and this is just a passing thought: I am reminded of Peirce here. In a categorial scheme Secondness (reaction and relation) and Thirdness (the habits of created instants) both depend upon the generativity of creative Firstness (the can-be possible, i.e. deep hyperchaotic Potenzen). Relations and habits could not be if it weren't for Firsts. Whitehead, following Peirce here, goes on to essentialize the modal aspect of Firstness into his "eternal objects" - which are indeed timeless - but which are also nonetheless active and generative objects-as-powers (forms of objects, really). Now for Hartshorne, on the other hand, these eternal objects do not "exist" until they are created. The pre-actual items of the universe are not and in being-not possess a virtual power (ala Meillassoux).
In conclusion, it is simply wrong-headed to call Whitehead a "relationist" without emphasizing some features of this thought which seem to balance or temper the relational aspect of his work, e.g. his temporalism, his theory of modes vis-a-vis eternal objects, the doctrine of contributionism, or in general taking account of what dynamic singular agents do versus how they simply "relate." This all involves a processive account of the universe which goes beyond a simple relational philosophy. Change (temporalism) and generativity (creativity) are at the core of Whithead's thought, not just an account of relations.
Thursday, October 4, 2012
Meillassoux recants earlier position, declares himself a correlationist
This is nothing new, but it was openly affirmed (per Zizek at his talk in Toronto). We also now know that "speculative realism" is a term that he is distancing himself from.
Some other quick thoughts:
Three of the four SR originals question SR's very existence as a school of thought, or "speculative realism" as such. In other words, "speculative realism" may be best characterized as a tendency or group of philosophical characteristics (materialism, realism, etc.) rather than a concrete school. Looking at SR as a concrete phenomenon with rigid borders rather than a fluid philosophical tendency may be reducing things down to a single term which ought to resist categorization.
However, I've often thought about whether there is just one idea or concept which would put the four original SR philosophers in the same boat. A "critique of correlationism" would be it, even if someone like Meillassoux ultimately returns to it after deconstructing its history.
As for the offshoots of speculative realism: I've always said that no one in their right mind would refer to their own position as "speculative realist" or call themself a "speculative realist." Analagously, no one openly called themself a "postmodernist" but rather identified with deconstructionism, post-structuralism, etc.
On the other hand, I find it troublesome when one tries to cut a neat divide between the various SR factions strictly along some epistemological/ontological axis. There doesn't appear to be just one neat line that one can draw in order to put SR folks into little boxes, despite there being a multitude of factions. (As an aside: I also find it troublesome when we try to "dictate" who can belong and who can't, to whatever faction, or blankly state "if you believe this then you are that," or state that "this person is part of the conversation, that person isn't." Not true. We're all partners in this dance, like it or not - so this business about allowing others to "be part of" the discussion or conversation or whatever is just bull. Everyone is allowed to "be a part of" the conversation, Zizek included).
It probably can go without saying that my own personal interest is in Meillassoux's divine inexistence. Another philosopher whose perspective I enjoy is Iain Hamilton Grant, and his "neo-vitalism. As well, Brassier's forthcoming naturalism is also something that I enjoy wrestling with. So that's probably why I've been engaging with them lately.
Some other quick thoughts:
Three of the four SR originals question SR's very existence as a school of thought, or "speculative realism" as such. In other words, "speculative realism" may be best characterized as a tendency or group of philosophical characteristics (materialism, realism, etc.) rather than a concrete school. Looking at SR as a concrete phenomenon with rigid borders rather than a fluid philosophical tendency may be reducing things down to a single term which ought to resist categorization.
However, I've often thought about whether there is just one idea or concept which would put the four original SR philosophers in the same boat. A "critique of correlationism" would be it, even if someone like Meillassoux ultimately returns to it after deconstructing its history.
As for the offshoots of speculative realism: I've always said that no one in their right mind would refer to their own position as "speculative realist" or call themself a "speculative realist." Analagously, no one openly called themself a "postmodernist" but rather identified with deconstructionism, post-structuralism, etc.
On the other hand, I find it troublesome when one tries to cut a neat divide between the various SR factions strictly along some epistemological/ontological axis. There doesn't appear to be just one neat line that one can draw in order to put SR folks into little boxes, despite there being a multitude of factions. (As an aside: I also find it troublesome when we try to "dictate" who can belong and who can't, to whatever faction, or blankly state "if you believe this then you are that," or state that "this person is part of the conversation, that person isn't." Not true. We're all partners in this dance, like it or not - so this business about allowing others to "be part of" the discussion or conversation or whatever is just bull. Everyone is allowed to "be a part of" the conversation, Zizek included).
It probably can go without saying that my own personal interest is in Meillassoux's divine inexistence. Another philosopher whose perspective I enjoy is Iain Hamilton Grant, and his "neo-vitalism. As well, Brassier's forthcoming naturalism is also something that I enjoy wrestling with. So that's probably why I've been engaging with them lately.
Protevi on God and the Organism (MP3/VIDEO)
Below are the links to the audio file and to the iTunesU:
Wednesday, October 3, 2012
Monday, October 1, 2012
process-relational philosophy and value experience
Steven Shaviro has two posts HERE and HERE covering among other topics processes of individuation (Simondon) and the basic nature of value experience (Whitehead). These two posts have prompted me to go and dig through my own posts/thoughts on the subject and repost them below, as I apparently have covered alot of similar themes over the past year and thought readers might benefit from taking a look. But first just a thought of introduction.
A basic truth spoken by Whitehead and Hartshorne is that the value character of experience is determined by various intensities which, relating to each other, form the basic aesthetic contrasts of experience. The crucial question does not concern the relations between or among the intensities of experience (although this is an interesting question), but rather how these intensities communicate singular expressions of perspective and thus may be taken as self-determining becoming-subjects in their own right. In other words, how do singular "firsts" come to be? In the generation of "firsts" (dynamic singular agents) the value character of experience becomes ethical and political when "seconds" and "thirds" are added - although as a "first" any agent is always already primitively aesthetic - felt as some positive character of experience.
Or to put it another way, from Firsts (aesthetic quality) we get Seconds (reaction, clashes) and Thirds (generalities, law) together in a categorial scheme. Peirce saw this quite clearly, as did Whitehead.
"The correction of defects in traditional versions of Idealism."
From Charles Hartshorne, The Zero Fallacy.
MV: One perhaps puzzling aspect of your philosophy is your “idealism.” For you, objects do not depend on our particular experiences of them; rather, you believe in the asymmetrical dependence of subjects on their objects. Thus, epistemologically speaking, you are not an idealist but a realist. However, you contend that “Epistemological realism is entirely compatible with metaphysical idealism.” What, exactly, does your “metaphysical idealism” entail, and is “idealistic” indeed an appropriate label for your type of metaphysics?
H: I deal with this especially in “The Synthesis of Idealism and Realism,” Theoria 15 (1949); also in “What was True in Idealism,” Philos 43 (1946). The key is fourfold: (1) subject-object relations are subject-subject relations so far as objects are active singulars and concrete, otherwise the objects are abstractions from or collections of such subjects; (2) actual objects are temporally prior to and hence independent of subjects to which they are given; (3) subjects (Leibniz) are enormously varied and in the vast majority of kinds more or less radically different from human persons, varying from feelings of electrons, say, at the lower end of the hierarchy, to God at the upper end; (4) fully concrete and particular subjects are not persons and the like, but single experiences (Whitehead’s actual entities). My psychicalism and Whitehead’s “reformed subjectivism” are virtually the same, so far as I can see. The subject-object relation is prehension. No one else ever clearly had this idea previously. Tibetan Buddhism seems to have come fairly close, Berkeley and Hegel not at all.
- Hartshorne on internal and external relations
- In defense of relations (again)
- Whitehead's concept of importance and James' "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings"
- Hartshorne, Leibniz, panpsychism
- Whitehead's God and powers: a response to "subjectalism"
- Shaviro on aesthetics and forms of life
- What is Nature?
- The upholding and sharing of value intensity
- Do animals grieve?
From Charles Hartshorne, The Zero Fallacy.
MV: One perhaps puzzling aspect of your philosophy is your “idealism.” For you, objects do not depend on our particular experiences of them; rather, you believe in the asymmetrical dependence of subjects on their objects. Thus, epistemologically speaking, you are not an idealist but a realist. However, you contend that “Epistemological realism is entirely compatible with metaphysical idealism.” What, exactly, does your “metaphysical idealism” entail, and is “idealistic” indeed an appropriate label for your type of metaphysics?
H: I deal with this especially in “The Synthesis of Idealism and Realism,” Theoria 15 (1949); also in “What was True in Idealism,” Philos 43 (1946). The key is fourfold: (1) subject-object relations are subject-subject relations so far as objects are active singulars and concrete, otherwise the objects are abstractions from or collections of such subjects; (2) actual objects are temporally prior to and hence independent of subjects to which they are given; (3) subjects (Leibniz) are enormously varied and in the vast majority of kinds more or less radically different from human persons, varying from feelings of electrons, say, at the lower end of the hierarchy, to God at the upper end; (4) fully concrete and particular subjects are not persons and the like, but single experiences (Whitehead’s actual entities). My psychicalism and Whitehead’s “reformed subjectivism” are virtually the same, so far as I can see. The subject-object relation is prehension. No one else ever clearly had this idea previously. Tibetan Buddhism seems to have come fairly close, Berkeley and Hegel not at all.
Tuesday, September 18, 2012
ethics, politics and neo-vitalism
Against the Grain Radio Program, Mon 9.17.12. Suzanne Guerlac on Bergson and the Open Society
We feel a connection to family and to nation -- but what about to all of humanity and, beyond that, to every living being? Henri Bergson wondered how we could move from an us-versus-them mentality to what he called the open society. He also drew a distinction between the body made swollen by our consumption patterns and the relatively shrunken human soul. Suzanne Guerlac explains and assesses Bergson's ideas.
HT dmf for the link HERE containing some good commentary on how neo-vitalism may appropriate Bergson to think about issues in politics, ethics, and religion.
Monday, September 17, 2012
a note about "point scoring"
I've actually remarked about this once before. HERE. The sooner philosophers learn that it's not about scoring points, gate keeping, clutching spots, and trying to run with fashion, the better.
The better? The rigor of academic work which draws on chains of reasoning in the mobilization of concepts, a striving to creatively attain theses, activity which acknowledges sources and then builds one's own arguments with those acknowledged sources in the background - this would do everyone some good.
Agent Swarm blog has in mind (I think) what I have in mind, see HERE.
Relevant quotes from his post:
I would actually disagree with this last sentence only because blogs tend to be scanned rather than read. Which is why the blog mini-treatise undoubtedly fails (especially when treatise-length posts are hurled at you every other day).
So in essence blogging can let you highlight your comprehensions and perceptions, but the real hard work comes in the crafting of a tight and solid well-argued article or paper which deserves to be slowly read (or carefully listened to) rather than quickly scanned.
This need not be a strictly "academic" affair (as in it's worth something only if it's in print), but only requires a medium where a slow, engaged response may be afforded. And typically that happens in the form of articles or books (open access online or print) rather than through tweets and blog posts. A tweet of 140 characters contributes only to perception war at best, a blog post communicates a flavor or provisionally articulates a thought or hunch or opinion - to be scanned by the reader, no more than 300-600 words, tops. An article/paper/review is what I read expecting real philosophical work.
The upside to blogging is that it is fluid and engages creative ideas with other scholars, it is a spiritual practice in the sense it helps to direct and shape one's own philosophical and personal trajectory of thought - a "mode of subjectivation," and that is good. But when the rubber meets the road, well-argued articles and books shall forever (it seems) trump blog posts and tweets.
The better? The rigor of academic work which draws on chains of reasoning in the mobilization of concepts, a striving to creatively attain theses, activity which acknowledges sources and then builds one's own arguments with those acknowledged sources in the background - this would do everyone some good.
Agent Swarm blog has in mind (I think) what I have in mind, see HERE.
Relevant quotes from his post:
Can the internet favour acts of enunciation, and thus of individuation, of a new and more democratic nature? Adam Robbert at KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY has published a very interesting post on blogging as a mode of philosophical expression....Robbert admits the possibility of a “carnival of ideas” allowing us to renew our feeling of “intellectual excitement” that presided over oour initial enthusiasm for philosophy. But he seems to relegate this to a purely psychological dimension of passionate exchange between peers....Robbert is concerned about an important aspect of philosophy, namely its dialogical dimension. But surely twitter feeds and comment threads do not exhaust the possibilities of philosophical dialogue on the internet, nor are they condemned by their very essence to be arbitrary, wrong-headed, and narcissistic. An interesting phenomenon is the dialogue between blogs, which permits the authors to take their time in building up arguments and mobilising concepts.
I would actually disagree with this last sentence only because blogs tend to be scanned rather than read. Which is why the blog mini-treatise undoubtedly fails (especially when treatise-length posts are hurled at you every other day).
Robbert affirms that “the ecology of the blogging medium doesn’t permit the kind of long-chain, rigorous explication of ideas that philosophy and academic inquiry require”. I think he is right in emphasizing the importance of long circuits and rigorous explication, but I regret this conclusion in favour of the academic style as the only rigorous one. The carnival of ideas , he seems to say, can get us motivated again, but the real work is in the academy and expressed in the academic style.
[...]
I think philosophical blogging can let you highlight what Deleuze and Guattari called the “non-philosophical” comprehension in terms of percepts and affects that provokes, accompanies, and extends philophical comprehension. The danger is to confuse this with your own empirical non-conceptualised feelings and experiences. A blog is also adapted to conceptual experimentation (the “carnival of ideas”), allowing your thought to be a little more open, more fluid, more transversal. It can favour encounters with other thinkers. In my case these encounters have been few and far between, but very enriching when they occur, enough to encourage me to keep on blogging despite meeting often with indifference or hostility. The other aspect that I find important is the exploring of philosophy as a “mode of subjectivation” (Deleuze) or a “spiritual exercise” (Hadot, Foucault, Onfray), or as I now prefer to call it a process of individuation (Jung, Simondon, Deleuze, and Bernard Stiegler).
So in essence blogging can let you highlight your comprehensions and perceptions, but the real hard work comes in the crafting of a tight and solid well-argued article or paper which deserves to be slowly read (or carefully listened to) rather than quickly scanned.
This need not be a strictly "academic" affair (as in it's worth something only if it's in print), but only requires a medium where a slow, engaged response may be afforded. And typically that happens in the form of articles or books (open access online or print) rather than through tweets and blog posts. A tweet of 140 characters contributes only to perception war at best, a blog post communicates a flavor or provisionally articulates a thought or hunch or opinion - to be scanned by the reader, no more than 300-600 words, tops. An article/paper/review is what I read expecting real philosophical work.
The upside to blogging is that it is fluid and engages creative ideas with other scholars, it is a spiritual practice in the sense it helps to direct and shape one's own philosophical and personal trajectory of thought - a "mode of subjectivation," and that is good. But when the rubber meets the road, well-argued articles and books shall forever (it seems) trump blog posts and tweets.
Sunday, September 16, 2012
Metaphysics and the Great Divide: Neoclassical- vs. Neo-Pragmatism
I thought that this post (and comment) by Jason Hills from immanent transcendence blog was interesting. Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, is essentially unknown to Huw Price (cited in Jason's post) who is a proclaimed pragmatist extraordinaire with an interest in deflating metaphysics. Peirce has a robust metaphysics, perhaps one that is more systematically developed than other pragmatist metaphysics on either side of the divide.
Regardless of this fact, Peirce's metaphysics and speculative philosophy, his non-correlationist phenomenology and his aesthetics, even his "speculative grammar," all receive short shrift today. Another very important figure who is neglected (not a pragmatist, but a philosopher for whom Peirce was key) is Justus Buchler.
I keep hammering on how a retrieval of Whitehead by contemporary metaphysicians demands a retrieval of both Peirce and Buchler. When it comes to metaphysics, most pragmatists are anemic compared to these two.
To some credit however, recent speculative philosophers (philosophers of the new metaphysics, for example) such as Quentin Meillassoux have given a nod to Peirce's semiotics with the Meillassouxian "kenotype," as found in Meillassoux's 'Repetition' Berlin paper. Nathan Brown also has given a nod to Peirce, as has Adrian Ivakhiv and Jane Bennett.
But Buchler's Peircean-Whiteheadian "ordinal" metaphysics is up for first-grabs for any contemporary speculative philosopher and I would like to see it happen.
http://immanenttranscedence.blogspot.com/2012/09/the-great-divide-neoclassical-vs-neo.html?m=1#comment-form
Regardless of this fact, Peirce's metaphysics and speculative philosophy, his non-correlationist phenomenology and his aesthetics, even his "speculative grammar," all receive short shrift today. Another very important figure who is neglected (not a pragmatist, but a philosopher for whom Peirce was key) is Justus Buchler.
I keep hammering on how a retrieval of Whitehead by contemporary metaphysicians demands a retrieval of both Peirce and Buchler. When it comes to metaphysics, most pragmatists are anemic compared to these two.
To some credit however, recent speculative philosophers (philosophers of the new metaphysics, for example) such as Quentin Meillassoux have given a nod to Peirce's semiotics with the Meillassouxian "kenotype," as found in Meillassoux's 'Repetition' Berlin paper. Nathan Brown also has given a nod to Peirce, as has Adrian Ivakhiv and Jane Bennett.
But Buchler's Peircean-Whiteheadian "ordinal" metaphysics is up for first-grabs for any contemporary speculative philosopher and I would like to see it happen.
http://immanenttranscedence.blogspot.com/2012/09/the-great-divide-neoclassical-vs-neo.html?m=1#comment-form
Thursday, September 13, 2012
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